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2012 [2011]  translated into Japanese and Arabic) and The Edinburgh Companion to the 
History of Democracy (Edinburgh University Press and Oxford University Press, 2015 
[2012]).  
Abstract 
This paper sets out an ambitious critique of contemporary political scientists, political 
historians and others concerned with the history of democracy. It argues that overwhelmingly 
the history of democracy relies on an overtly Eurocentric narrative that emphasizes the 
keystone moments of Western civilization. According to this narrative, democracy has a clear 
trajectory that can be traced from ancient experiments with participatory government in 
Greece and to a lesser extent in Rome, through the development of the British parliament, the 
American Declaration of Independence and the French Revolution, and then finally onto the 
triumphant march of the liberal model of democracy across the globe over the last 200 years, 
particularly under Western tutelage. Histories of democracy that focus exclusively on these 
events not only privilege Europe and its successful colonies, but also miss the broader human 
story of the struggle for and achievement of democracy.  
This presents us with a distinct challenge. For those whose heritage does not include a direct 
embrace democracy. This paper concludes by noting that, as democracy spreads out across 
the world today, political scientists not only need to break down the intellectual orthodoxy 
that democracy has exclusively Western roots, but also to embrace a more global view of 
democracy as a political practise that has been present at various times and in sometimes 
unfamiliar ways in the complex histories and rich cultural traditions of most of the people of 
the earth. 
Introduction 
In Setting the People Free: The Story of Democracy John Dunn opens with a brief account of 
the history of democracy, arguing that it can be understood as   
the story of a word of casual origins, and with a long and often ignominious history 
olitical imagination 
and a half thousand years ago, flourished briefly but scintillatingly, and then faded 
ck to life as a 
had a]
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-quarters of a century democracy has become 
the political core of the civilization which the West offers to the rest of the world. 
(Dunn, 2005: 13-4) 
 
(Isakhan & Stockwell, 2012 [2011]-a: 4-10). In the view of Dunn and those of 
his ilk, democracy has a clear trajectory that can be traced from ancient experiments with 
participatory government in Greece and to a lesser extent in Rome, through the development 
of the British parliament, the American Declaration of Independence and the French 
Revolution, and then finally onto the triumphant march of the liberal model of democracy 
across the globe over the last 200 years, particularly under Western tutelage.  
 
While there can be no denying the fact that each of these epochs have made an important 
contribution to our understanding of democracy and have had a profound impact on our 
understanding of associated concepts such as human rights, justice, liberty, personal freedoms 
and minority representation, they do not tell the whole story. Histories of democracy that 
focus exclusively on these events not only privilege Europe and her successful colonies, but 
also miss the broader human story of the struggle for, and achievement of, democracy. 
achieved the status of received 
wisdom: it is taught in classrooms across the globe, it is endlessly recycled in the news 
media, it forms the plot of epic novels and Hollywood blockbusters and it informs much of 
the policy-making that governs the world in which we live. 
 
Thankfully, in recent years a counter-narrative has emerged which has sought to break down 
the intellectual orthodoxy that underpins this traditional Eurocentric story by bringing to the 
surface some of the lesser known histories of democracy, thereby opening up debate and 
discourse on the complex origins and multiple trajectories of this sophisticated form of 
government (Goody, 2006; Hobson, 2004; Isakhan, 2007a, 2012; Isakhan & Stockwell, 2012 
[2011]-c, 2015 [2012]; Markoff, 1999; Markoff & Herrera, 2014; Muhlberger & Paine, 1993; 
Sadiki, 2004; Sen, 1999, 2003). A key contribution to the intellectual foundations of this 
work can be found in the writing of Fred Dallmayr (Dallmayr, 1996, 2010). In his Border 
Crossings: Toward a Comparative Political Theory, Dallmayr argues that 
As practiced in most Western universities, the study of political theory or philosophy 
bashed 
derivation from key features of modern Western politics, including the structures of 
the secular nation-state with its accent on proceduralism, separated powers, and the 
cal 
theorizing would need to be genuinely global in character, by ranging from Europe 
and the Americas to Africa, Asia and Australasia. (Dallmayr, 1999: 2) 
 
Most recently, the theme of exploring the broader and deeper history of democracy has 
The Life and Death of 
Democracy. Here, Keane asks 
spread and its uncertain future, arguing that such work has been:  
spurred on by deep dissatisfaction with the parochialism of much contemporary 
writing about democracy. Despite many rich insights, the standard works on 
democracy make it seem as if its languages, institutions and ideals are still essentially 
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democracy, one that is no longer conceived within the confines of national and 
linguistic boundaries. (Keane, 2009: 880) 
 
Building atop these earlier works, this article offers a fresh critique of the work of Dunn and 
other political scientists and historians who have propagated the Eurocentric history of 
democracy. The papers argues that such work can be dissected and critiqued along several 
key lines: their reliance on a distinctly patriarchal discourse riddled with prejudices; the 
assertion that one can understand the history of democracy via the etymology of the word 
itself; ed in the 
canon of Western political thought. The paper concludes by calling on contemporary political 
scientists and political historians concerned with the history of democracy to be careful in re-
iterating this deeply flawed history of democracy and to instead work towards a history of 
democracy that retrieves the silenced histories and the forgotten democratic moments that lay 
behind the roar of Western power.  
 
  
Some Fundamental Problems with the ‘Standard History of Democracy’  
 
immediate problems. The first and perhaps most obvious is that the bulk of the historical 
periods Dunn refers to are filled with people who despised democracy. It ought to be 
remembered that demokratia was very unpopular among prominent Greek scholars such as 
[Pseudo-Xenophon]. Generally speaking, they viewed democracy as a bad example of 
government, in which the brutish will of the masses usurps the natural position of the wealthy 
and well-educated elite (Isakhan, 2012 [2011]: 19-20; 2015 [2012]: 5). Many centuries later, 
as democracy gradually emerged as a real political option across Europe and North America, 
scholars such as Thomas Hobbes, Louis de Bonald and James Madison parroted the Grecian 
concern that democracy would undermine the authority of the aristocracy and give rise to 
mob rule (Bonald, 2004 [1818]; Hobbes, 2002 [1651]; Madison, 1981 [1788]).  
 
A second key problem 
this history virtually every attempt to define, un
occurred within a small circle of largely white, wealthy Anglo-American men, mostly from 
the elite class of their respective societies (Sadiki, 2004: 6). The history of democracy is 
therefore underpinned by a narrative that is enmeshed within a broader patriarchal and elitist 
tradition that is, of course, very undemocratic. An ideal history of democracy would be broad 
enough to include the diverse histories and experiences of women, minorities and subalterns 
who have lived under one type or another of democracy. 
 
Perhaps because of this elite patriarchal lineage, democracy has also almost always been 
underpinned by a third problem, that of exclusion. Most of the periods Dunn is referring to 
had very narrow definitions of what constituted the citizen body. Few if any of his historical 
examples would pass modern criteria for a democracy simply because they so actively 
excluded people from the political process. As just two quick examples, participation in the 
Athenian assembly was limited by five defining characteristics: age (adult), gender (male), 
ancestry (Athenian), military service (completed military training) and birth (free-born people 
only, not slaves or children of slaves). As a second example, it ought to be remembered that, 
from its inception, US democracy marginalised large swathes of the population  women, 
slaves, other minorities, and so on. While the hard won battles of various civil rights 
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movements throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries have gradually expanded the 
parameters of citizenship, modern democracies still confront wide disparities and inequalities. 
This is evident during the election cycle where, even in advanced democracies like the United 
Sates, voter turnout rarely gets above 50% with less than 15% of the voting population of 
significant minorities such as Black, Asian and Hispanic Americans casting a ballot (File, 
2013). 
 
periods he touches on were filled with elite critics of democracy, were riven with exclusions 
and prejudices and were enveloped within a distinctly Anglo-American patriarchal discourse. 
 
 
A Democracy by any other  name…? 
 
f democracy also presents us with two far 
more substantive problem that need to be addressed. The first is that, throughout his book, 
Dunn frequently equates the history of democracy with the history of the word itself (see for 
example: Dunn, 2005: 23-4). While it is certainly true that the word demokratia was invented 
in ancient Greece and came into Late Latin, before being adapted to the French word 
democratie in the sixteenth century and the modern English word democracy in more recent 
times, a similar trajectory can be traced for many ancient Greek words that remain in 
common parlance today. 
 
etymology to democracy and yet today we readily acknowledge that, for example, the ancient 
Chinese or medieval Arabs practised and contributed greatly to the discipline of philosophy 
even though we understand that they may not have used a Greek word to describe their most 
pr
of democracy, but no genuine history of astronomy is complete without some 
acknowledgement of the contributions of ancient Mesopotamia or medieval India again, with 
t
document their observations of celestial mechanics. 
 
What these examples demonstrate is that the etymology of a word is not equivalent to its 
history as a practise. By focusing on the use of the word democracy , we therefore miss the 
fact that many of the people who have practiced or lived under or fought for democracy have 
not used the Greek-der
that ancient Assyrians or Israelites, medieval Muslims or Scandinavians, or pre-colonial 
Africans or Maoris did not use a Greek word to describe their best governmental 
arrangements. This does not mean that these people did not practise democracy, only that 
they did not use the word (Isakhan, 2015 [2012]: 8-12).  
 
An insistence on understanding the history of democracy via the use of the word itself also 
means that, because this word has not been used in other linguistic traditions to describe their 
models of inclusive governance, the practice of democracy can be dismissed as being foreign 
to their respective history and culture. This is just as true for the leaders of the Chinese 
Communist Party, some of whom have argued that 
incompatible with democracy (Bristow, 2011), as it is for hardline Islamists who argue that 
there is no democracy in Islam and that democracy  is a foreign concept to the Muslim world 
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(CNN, 2005). Such people rest much of their argument on the fact that no historical Chinese 
or Islamic government has ever described itself using the word democracy . 
 
comes to democracy. If we were to insist on only including those who use the word 
democracy  to describe their governmental arrangements before they can be included in the 
history of democracy, then we are forced to include some very un-democratic regimes. As an 
claimed to be creating a democracy compatible with Arab and Iraqi culture (Isakhan, 2012: 
105-9). In a similar vein, one would hardly want to include the old (East) German 
Korea (North Korea) and the Democratic Republic of the Congo among 
the pantheon of democracies. An insistence on the use of the word democracy  to be 
included in its history therefore overlooks the fact that many who had never heard the word 
lived up to its key principles, while several who call themselves democrats fall well short of 
its minimum criteria (Isakhan & Stockwell, 2012 [2011]-b: 221-3). In assessing the depth and 
it is important to focus on the approximation of best practice 
rather than the employment of particular nomenclature to describe it. 
 
 
The Eurocentric Roots of the ‘Standard History of Democracy’  
 
-American elitism, 
patriarchy, exclusion and etymology all converge to present us with perhaps the biggest 
single problem with his analysis, namely that it is profoundly Eurocentric. For Dunn and 
many like him, the history of democracy is also the history of Western civilization. Indeed, 
North 
America. This perpetuates a very specific understanding of the nature of democracy itself, 
become synonymous with those political moments and 
traditions of Western Europe and the United States. This presents a distinct challenge: for 
those whose heritage does not include a direct link to Greek assemblies, the American 
 
 
hat democracy has a 
(Dunn, 2005: 14). The implication 
here is twofold. Firstly, it implies that the rest of the world does not have a legitimate 
democratic history to draw upon and that the only path to democratization is via 
perhaps even an obligation, to spread democracy to those regions of the world that do not 
the rest of the world. The problem here is that, when 
seen as a sign of the merits of this model, and as a vindication of European hegemony, while 
failures have been seen as a result of the inability of non-Europeans to grasp the complexity 
of democracy and of their preference for violence, disorder and autocracy. 
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However, it ought to be pointed out that such sentiments are far from new. The history of 
democracy has long been couched  sometimes unwittingly, sometimes deliberately  in a 
series of very old ideas about the supposed political divide between East and West. This 
divide relies on a distinct dualism. Here, the West is seen as having a unique inclination 
towards democracy, it tolerates diversity and opposing points of view, it encourages 
innovation and excellence, and it supports freedom, equality and the rule of law. 
Paradoxically, the East is seen to be driven by impulses that give way to vice and violence, 
that rely on stagnant traditions and out-dated modes of culture, that limit freedom of 
expression, and that give rise to unimaginably cruel tyrants who rule by fear, oppression and 
bloodshed. These are, of course, overly simplistic ways of looking at both the political history 
of the Occident and the Orient. Not only do they reduce rich and complex histories to a 
storybook narrative, but they routinely ignore the myriad places and times in which the West 
itself has acted oppressively and tyrannically, while the East has practiced tolerance, 
cooperation and the rule of law. Repeated and recycled with little critique, this simple 
dualism has amounted to an intellectual orthodoxy that helps explain away complex realities: 
the West has a duty to spread democra , but the 
project is futile because the East is trapped in an unescapable web of barbarism and 
bellicosity. 
 
traced back 
through the entire canon of Western political thought (Isakhan, 2012: 15-36). For example, 
while influential Greek thinkers such as Herodotus and Aristotle are widely recognized for 
their contribution to the understanding and formulation of demokratia, they were 
simultaneously amongst the first to discuss the concept of despotism, which they attributed to 
the Orient. For his part, Aristotle tended to equate the Occident with democracy and the 
Orient with despotism, arguing that the people of the East were susceptible to oppression by 
forms of total power because:  
barbarians [non- re 
governments] have the nature of tyrannies because the people are by nature slaves; 
but there is no danger of their being overthrown. (Aristotle, 1943 [350 BCE]: III.14) 
 
As a whole, the Greeks premised much of their argument about such issues on an assumption, 
not only about their own civility and democratic nature, but also about the backwardness and 
barbarity of non-Greeks and about their history of tyranny and oppression. 
 
Such notions of democracy as a uniquely Western proclivity achieved renewed momentum 
throughout the seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, as discussions of 
representative government gradually grew across Europe and America. During this period 
there was an enormous intellectual effort to connect modern European experiments with 
democracy to those of ancient Athens, even though modern central-European Christians had 
little in common with the ancient pagan Greeks, other than the vague notion that they were 
(Bernal [1987] 1991). A virtual consensus emerged that, because 
democracy had succeeded among the Greeks and was being practised by the British or 
French, democracy and its history were inexorably tied to Western civilisation (Bryce, 1921a, 
1921b; Goodwin, 1864; Maines, 1976 [1885]; Norcross, 1883). The other key consensus was 
that the Orient had a very different history. For many seminal European authors, Asiatic 
history was routinely characterized as being trapped in an inviolable web of despotism, 
stagnation, barbarousness, slavery, disorder, moral decay and effeminacy  characteristics 
that certainly prevented progress towards democracy. 
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One example is the early travelogues in which wealthy aristocratic British and French 
explorers such as Master Thomas Dallam, Sir George Courthope, Sir Jean Chardin and Jean-
Baptiste Tavernier recorded their adventures (Chardin, 1720 [1686]; Courthope, 1907 [1616-
1685]; Dallam, 1893 [1599-1600]; Tavernier, 1977 [1676]-a, 1977 [1676]-b). In Sir Jean 
Chardin’s Travels in Persia, for example, the narrative exposes the drunken, brutal and 
arbitrary despotism of the Persian king through the eyes of a rational French merchant and 
diplomat. The king is seen to command absolute obedience to his every whim, no matter how 
heinous his request or how inebriated he is at the time of his demands. This is perhaps best 
illustrated in the relationship between the King and his Prime Minister, who admits to the 
King 
submission, the king repeatedly humiliates the Prime Minister in front of the court by using 
(Chardin, 1720 [1686]: 16-17). Such despotism was reported back to Europe as 
indicative of the Persian  and by implication, Eastern  model of governance, a model of 
drunken cruelty that would have contrasted sharply with the apparent civility of Europe at the 
time (Grossrichard, 1998 [1979]). 
 
ench philosopher Charles 
Louis Montesquieu attempted to illustrate that autocracy benefited no one by using Persia as 
the model despotic empire, which he viewed as representative of a broader Oriental 
despotism that pervaded all aspects of Asiatic life (Montesquieu, 1923 [1721]). In The Spirit 
of the Laws Montesquieu claimed that climate and geography predisposed certain regions to 
grand reason of the weakness of Asia, and of the strength of Europe; of the liberty of Europe, 
rea
(Montesquieu, 1949 [1748]: 264, 266, 269). 
 
The eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, not only witnessed the series of events and 
upheavals across Europe and the United States that were to pave the way for modern 
representative democracy, but also saw the cementation of familiar stereotypes regarding the 
 were frequently drawn upon without 
scrutiny or independent research (Bhabha, 1990; Said, 2003 [1978]). This is evident in the 
works of influential scholars such as the German philosopher Georg Hegel who developed a 
Eurocentric approach to world history in which the Asiatic civilizations that had once 
contributed to the narrative of human history, now lay at its periphery (Bernal, 1991 [1987]: 
294-6; Gran, 1996: 2-3). While Hegel is considerably more generous to the kingdoms of the 
(Hegel, 1952 [1837]: 235). In 
discussing the Persian Empire he argues that its success was enabled by its ability to quell the 
natural barbarousness of the people. He argues that 
It was not given to the Asiatics to unite self-dependence, freedom, and substantial 
vigour of mind, with culture, i.e., an interest for diverse pursuits and an acquaintance 
with the conveniences of life. Military valour among them is consistent only with 
barbarity of manners. It is not the calm courage of order; and when their mind opens 
to a sympathy with various interests, it immediately passes into effeminacy; allows its 
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energies to sink, and makes men slaves of an enervated sensuality. (Hegel, 1952 
[1837]: 242)  
 
Such sentiments are also evident in the works of James Mill who had never been to India, but 
was nonetheless employed by the English-owned East India Company to pen the six-volume 
The History of British India. Throughout this classically reductive text, Mill seeks to justify 
the actions of both the Company and the Crown by relying on pejorative assumptions and 
racialist ideologies (Inden, 1990; Majeed, 1992). Throughout his works, Mill (the father of 
the famous political theorist John Stuart Mill) reiterates the notion of Oriental despotism as 
he imagined it to be in India, claiming that 
Among the Hindus, according to the Asiatic model, the government was monarchical, 
and, with the usual exception of religion and its ministers, absolute. No idea of any 
system of rule, different from the will of a single person, appears to have entered the 
minds of them, or their legislators. (Mill, 1972 [1817]: 212-3) 
 
Algeria. While Tocqueville was so generous in his appraisal of Democracy in America (de 
Tocqueville, 1864 [1835]) and so certain that it would continue to flourish there, he was 
equally certain that, despite the best efforts of the French to civilize the Algerians, Arabs 
would never overcome their penchant for violence and tyranny. For Tocqueville, the Arabs 
were not only difficult to govern, they were also unable to govern themselves and were 
unlikely to ever develop anything akin to democracy. In one particularly revealing passage of 
Writings on Empire and Slavery, De Tocqueville writes 
that for quite a long time  we cannot know how long  domination of the Arabs will 
be onerous. This is because of the social organization of this people, their tribal 
organization and nomadic life, something we can do nothing about for a very long 
time, perhaps ever. Very small, nomadic societies require great effort and expense to 
be held in an order that will always be imperfect. And this great governmental effort 
produces very little, because the same causes that make them so difficult to govern 
also make them poor, needing little and producing little. (de Tocqueville, 2001 
[1841]: 62) 
 
Similarly, Karl Marx also inherited notions of Oriental despotism and the Asian propensity 
for stagnation. Overall, Marx tended to view the Orient through a series of stagnations or 
absences  those of civil society, bourgeoisie culture, private property, propensity for social 
change and modernizat
stifled by the constant dynastic change and the centralized ownership of property and 
production. The people were reduced to being the slaves of their despotic ruler, forced into 
menial labour and thereby unable to form civil movements or become upwardly mobile 
(Sawer, 1977; Turner, 1978). He further believed that the only route for Asian salvation was 
(Avineri, 1968; Turner, 1978).  
 
By the turn of the twentieth century the familiar tropes and stereotypes regarding the Oriental 
ed wisdom and were drawn upon without 
scrutiny or independent research. As one example, the German political economist 
Maximilian Weber began his work on the sociology of religion by writing The Protestant 
Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. Following Hegel and relying mostly on secondary 
Orientalist sources, Weber argued that religion had played a pivotal role in the unique 
development of Western capitalist society and, simultaneously, in preventing regions such as 
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the Orient from achieving analogous socio-political heights. He claimed that while 
Protestantism required believers to strive towards salvation, Asiatic religions such as 
Buddhism, Hinduism and Islam encouraged the faithful to accept the world as it is. Weber 
believed that the religious dichotomy between East and West had a profound effect on the 
realms of politics and law, arguing that 
all Indian political thought was lacking in a systematic method comparable to that of 
Aristotle, and, indeed, in the possession of rational concepts. Not all the anticipations 
in India (School of Mimamsa), nor the extensive codification especially in the Near 
East, nor all the Indian and other books of law, had the strictly systematic forms of 
thought, so essential to a rational jurisprudence, of the Roman law and of the Western 
law under its influence. A structure like the canon law is known only to the West. 
(Weber, 1992 [1904-5]: 14) 
 
More specifically, Weber viewed Islam as a relig
 (Turner, 1994: 29), which thereby disabled the Ummah (the Islamic 
community) from successfully challenging the political order and instigating social change 
(Turner, 1974). Despite the fact that Weber spent much of his life writing about Oriental 
cultures and religions, he rarely bothered to challenge his erroneous assumptions regarding 
the superiority of the West over the East. Perhaps even more problematic is the fact that his 
work went on to have a profound impact on European scholarship of Islam where, at least 
tended (either implicit (Burke, 
1988: 20). 
 
Together, scholars such as Montesquieu, Hegel, Mill, De Tocqueville, Marx and Weber 
representative democracy. They were also certain that, while Europe had a unique proclivity 
for democracy, the non-Europeans  Persians, 
Buddhists  were destined to stagnate under oppressive forms of governance. To say that this 
legacy has had an impact on perceptions of democracy and its history today would be a 
massive un
 tyrants and 
fundamentalists, pejorative policy pundits and politicians, and racialist journalists and 
academics  who use it to argue that certain peoples, or certain regions, simply do not have 
the requisite historical or cultural background to practise democracy successfully.  
 
To argue, however, that such notions are isolated to the works of nineteenth and early 
twentieth century scholars is to profoundly underestimate the pervasiveness of this discourse 
(Isakhan, 2007b, 2008, 2010). As democracy triumphed, largely under US tutelage, after 
WWII and the Cold War, it continued to be seen as most at home in the Western world or in 
places most heavily influence by it, with Anglo-Saxon Protestantism held up as the cultural 
or religious tradition most conducive to democracy (Almond & Verba, 1989 [1963]). To cite 
one very well-known example, political scientist Samuel P. Huntington has dedicated much 
of his work to arguing that each region of the globe has its own individual religio-cultural 
systems (Huntington, 1984). For example, 
anti-
institutions, and thus greatly complicate if not prevent the emergence and effectiveness of 
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(Huntington, 1991: 298, 300). Such views are not only Euro-centric and 
overtly racist, they are also alarming in their historical inaccuracy. 
 
Following in this vein, through the 1990s and into the new millennium scores of books have 
been written by political scientists and political historians purporting to document the history 
of democracy. Overwhelmingly, these works fail to challenge this intellectual orthodoxy, 
instead preferring to recycle the Eurocentric narrative drawing on familiar sources and widely 
held presuppositions about what democracy is and about its origins (Arblaster, 2002 [1987]; 
Dahl, 1998; Dunn, 1992; Lakoff, 1996; Roper, 2013; Stromberg, 1996). Instead of 
confronting new truths, illuminating dark corners or following difficult directions, they seem 
largely content to recycle the familiar and satisfying story with which we are all well familiar. 
Two brief examples must suffice. In his Democracy: A History of Ideas’  Boris DeWiel 
simply asserts that The culture of democracy, sometimes called Western civilization or 
simply the West, began about three millennia ago , before he begins his typically Eurocentric 
account of the history of democracy (DeWiel, 2000: 9). More recently, in his Of the People, 
By the People: A New History of Democracy, Roger Osborne claims that democracy is a 
Western invention  that  
have a say in government. Across the Atlantic we see how the practice of democracy 
came to Amer
European communism collapsed, leaving a world in which democracy became the 
passport to membership of the international community. (Osborne, 2012: 2-4) 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The history of democracy as described by the majority of contemporary political scientists 
and political historians is therefore profoundly flawed for several key reasons. Firstly, it is 
dominated by periods in which most prominent intellectuals were critics of democracy, 
periods in which the bulk of the population were excluded from the practice of politics, and 
periods underpinned by discourses of elite hegemony and Anglo-American male dominance. 
Secondly, the history of democracy is often mistakenly aligned with the etymology of the 
word itself, obfuscating those histories in which people may have approximated the practise 
of democracy but did not use a Greek word to describe their political arrangements. Finally, 
and perhaps most problematically, for most who claim to study the history of democracy, it is 
seen as synonymous with the keystone moments of Western civilization.  
 
This paper therefore offers an ambitious critique of those who have been, and are, content to 
typically Eurocentric narrative and pointed out its inherent racism and hubris, its historical 
inaccuracies, and its tendency to make democracy an exclusive doctrine that has little 
relevance to the peoples and histories outside the Anglo-American sphere. However, as 
Edward Said argued, shortly before his passing in 2004,  
There was never a misinterpretation that could not be revised, improved, or 
overturned. There was never a history that could not to some degree be recovered and 
compassionately understood in all its suffering and accomplishment. (Said, 2004: 22)  
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It is the central premise of this paper that the history of democracy has been profoundly 
n all their 
The task therefore of contemporary political scientists and 
political historians concerned with the history of democracy is to carefully retrieve the 
silenced histories and the forgotten democratic moments that lay behind the roar of Western 
power.  
 
Today, as democracy spreads out across the world, this work has never been more urgent. We 
need to broaden the narrative of democracy and break down the intellectual orthodoxy that 
democracy has exclusively Western roots. We also urgently need scholars who will carefully 
document forgotten histories and counter-narratives to demonstrate the extent to which 
democracy has been present at various times and in sometimes unfamiliar ways in the 
complex histories and rich cultural traditions of most of the people of the earth. We need a 
histories can not only be brought to light, but also how they can be used to help people all 
over the world to have a greater sense of ownership over democracy and take pride in 
practising and re-creating it for their time, for their situation and for their purposes. Finally, it 
mic system 
of governance underpinned by virtues and practices that have legitimate ancestry in every 
corner and culture of the globe. Scholars, democrats and citizens alike would do well to 
remember this as democracy is strived for, achieved, overturned and strived for again through 
the twenty-first century and beyond. 
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